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Outsourcing semiconductor device fabrication can result in malicious insertions and overbuilding of integrated circuits (ICs) by untrusted foundries without the IP owner’s knowledge. Active hardware metering methods attempt to combat IC piracy by requiring fabs to perform an activation protocol with the IP owner for each chip created. In this paper, we have taken a closer look at the IC metering through bus scrambling protocol mentioned in Maes et al., 2009 and we investigate alternatives which employ 1-out of 2 oblivious transfer (OT). Our focus is on Bellare Micali OT and Naor Pinkas OT, which, under certain assumptions, guarantee protection against malicious adversaries. Using OT as an alternative helps with the need to protect the integrity of the private input generated by the chip. Thus, the security of the protocol reduces to the Decisional Diffie Hellman sense. Finally, we discuss possible attacks and show how the proposed protocols could prevent them.